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 1 
Europe in the Political Imagination 
 
Jonathan White, LSE
1
 
 
White, Jonathan (2010), ‘Europe in the political imagination’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 48 (4). 1015-1038. ISSN 1468-5965 
 
 
‘The idea was to build up the markets there.  That was the point of the thing I think, the enlargement of the EU – 
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia etc. – to build up new markets there, so that the people there can also, how 
should I say, boost the economy here, so they can buy the products which are produced here.  It was already noted 
even back then – I can remember – in the political discussion that things would turn out as they have now, with 
this migration [of companies] to the East.  It was known even then, when all this was opened up.  It was done 
anyway though, and now … you asked earlier what can be done about it, it sounds very hard and sad when I say 
it, but actually nothing.  It has its own dynamic, the door has been opened and now it’s open!  You can’t close it 
any more.’   
Ralf, taxi-driver, Würzburg (Germany) 
 
 
In normative debates on the European Union, the argument is sometimes made that the allegiance of 
citizens to a transnational polity should be based on the opportunities it provides for promoting 
political goals.  Rather than locating community in some ‘sense of Europeanness’, centred on facts or 
perceptions of cultural commonality, or a supposed identity of constitutional values, this view holds 
that the collective bond should be that of a ‘community of projects’ (Nicolaidis 2004, p.103); also 
(Morgan 2005).  Such a view need by no means imply a technocratic understanding of the polity – 
plenty of scope may be afforded for deliberation and dispute concerning the goals to be pursued and 
the policies appropriate to them – but the suggestion is that citizens should regard the polity as 
something that responds to substantive concerns rather than something expressive of a unity of 
attributes or beliefs.   
 This paper presupposes there are good reasons for adopting this perspective on EU citizenship, 
but does not seek to engage directly in this normative debate.  Rather it explores how far there exists 
the ideational background necessary for such a perspective to resonate with EU citizens.  At a general 
level, it proposes that only if such a perspective sits well with existing understandings of what may be 
achieved politically, or if these are adapted to accord with it, is it likely to achieve plausibility amongst 
a wider population.  Empirically, the paper examines some of the recurrent motifs of political 
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understanding voiced by a series of EU citizens in interaction, and how these relate to the political 
significance they ascribe to the EU. 
 A project-oriented conception of the EU would seem to demand that citizens regard decision-
making at a European level as appropriate to tackling at least some of the political problems they 
consider important.  For these, Europe-wide measures would have to make sense in principle, even if 
the EU in its current form were thought deficient.  One can rephrase this as a two-step requirement.  
First, citizens would need to assume that the problems of significance to them are susceptible to some 
kind of organised address, whether centred on governmental institutions or collective action with other 
citizens, and that they are not simply unavoidable ‘facts of life’, or issues that can be sufficiently dealt 
with by individual adaptation alone.  Second, for at least some such problems there would need to be 
the conviction that it is both feasible and necessary for them to be tackled at a European level, rather 
than in a context more local or more global.
2
 
 The study presented here looks at the perspectives expressed in a series of group discussions 
with taxi-drivers in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic.  It examines how speakers talk about 
the political problems of significance to them, notably their origins and susceptibility to remedy, and 
the ways they evoke, or choose not to, the relevance of the EU.  Important variations across issue-area 
are highlighted using the empirically-derived categories of Economics, Relations between Peoples, and 
Society and the Law.  The paper shows how the way problems tend to be explained, combined with 
expectations concerning their susceptibility to address, generally forecloses common action at the 
European level as a convincing proposition.  Rather than contributing to the EU’s political credibility, 
these patterns of understanding invite it to be seen as largely irrelevant to certain sets of problem, 
while powerless to control, and indeed liable to exacerbate, others.  The paper thus develops a 
variegated picture of how far, and in what ways, ‘Europe’ and the EU are spontaneously invoked as 
reference-points when citizens make sense of their everyday circumstances (Meinhof 2004).   
 Such an approach differs sharply from quantitative studies in this area.  When polls are used to 
probe views on the EU, the goal is to identify positive or negative attitudes towards a clearly defined 
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 Other potentially relevant dispositions include willingness to regard citizens elsewhere in the EU as sufficiently like-
minded to be partners in pursuit of these goals, and decision-makers sufficiently trustworthy to act on ‘our’ behalf.  These 
are beyond this paper, though cf. (White 2010a) and (White 2010b). 
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object, whether European integration as a whole, its constituent policies, or the citizens of other 
member-states (Kohli 2000) (Hooghe & Marks 2007) (Duchesne 2008).  Political community is 
conceived in terms of citizens’ willingness to express explicit support or affective engagement.  
Conversely, studying interventions in a conversational setting, one can refocus attention on the 
assembly of reference-points people take for granted and the underlying repertoires of interpretation 
that structure (or inhibit) the formation of attitudes – on the ‘political imagination’, as it may 
conveniently be described.
3
  One can examine, for example, not just whether speakers consider EU 
enlargement good or bad, but the sense in which they consider it, like Ralf in the extract cited, almost 
inevitable, something with ‘its own dynamic’ scarcely responsive to political deliberation.  Drawing 
on political-sociological approaches rarely applied in the EU context (Gamson 1992; Perrin 2006), the 
paper investigates how the EU is conjured in the patterns of everyday political talk.   
 
 
Why Talk to Taxi-Drivers? 
 
If taxi-drivers are worth speaking to, perhaps the reader will assume this is because their views are 
held representative of a social group of particular significance.  Such an argument can certainly be 
made: the majority of taxi-drivers in EU members-states occupy the socio-economic space extending, 
on a conventional stratification scale, from the working- to the lower-middle classes, and while 
theories of mobilisation weigh their significance differently (Eder 1995), such classes and their 
political dispositions are from many perspectives important.  But there is no need thus to suppose 
either that taxi-drivers across the EU form a coherent social group, or that they themselves are actors 
of special consequence.  A better argument centres on the kinds of experience taxi-driving exposes its 
practitioners to: on the one hand they are in a position of heightened sensitivity to political 
developments such as changes in prices or spending behaviour, criminal activity, or the arrival of 
immigrant labour, while on the other they are exposed to a wide range of opinion stimuli – 
newspapers, radio, conversations with clients – ensuring theirs is not an isolated speech community.  
Furthermore, the self-understanding (Brubaker & Cooper 2000) of many taxi-drivers is arguably as 
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 The term is metaphorical, since we are dealing with trans-individual patterns of meaning rather than private cognition.  
 4 
people of commonsense; whereas academics or artists may set store by originality, taxi-drivers seem 
less inclined to emphasise the distinctiveness of their views.  Furthermore, their daily experiences do 
not invite unusually strong sympathy or antipathy towards the EU.  There is therefore reason to 
suppose that – alongside certain idiosyncratic concerns peculiar to taxi-drivers – one may find in their 
discussion, in a particularly concentrated form, some of the tacit assumptions and interpretative motifs 
dispersed more widely amongst citizens.
4
  
For this research, conducted between October 2004 and August 2005, groups of three to four 
drivers were assembled for two-hour discussions in ten mid-sized European cities – Reading, Swansea 
and Norwich in Britain; Plzeň, Liberec and Ostrava in the Czech Republic; and Erfurt, Lübeck, Kassel 
and Würzburg in Germany.
5
  These cities exhibit geographical spread and historical diversity, notably 
regarding the consolidation of democracy and the experience of foreign rule, yet continuity in the 
character of taxi-driving: it tends to be a full-time occupation, involving long-term residents rather 
than recent arrivals.  The study’s aim was to identify patterns of discursive practice widely present 
across the different sites, together with some of the salient variations between them.  Using group 
discussions allowed the researcher to minimise his interventions so as to study the kinds of knowledge 
and understanding participants expect of each other (Duchesne & Haegel 2007) (Gamson 1992).   
The discussions were loosely structured.  Approximately the first twenty minutes involved a 
categorisation exercise, designed to provoke a discussion in which one could study the importance 
speakers attributed to various political problems, how these were assumed to fit together, and the 
concepts used to link them.  Participants were invited to cluster a series of thematic index-cards 
according to ‘what goes naturally with what’, justifying their choices as they did so, and then to 
discuss how best to summarise each grouping with a heading.
6
  The researcher probed where 
necessary to encourage speakers to clarify their criteria of categorisation, recording the new headings 
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5
 There were 37 participants in total.  Those in each group were generally acquaintances, and often in conversation when 
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on additional cards, and noting disagreements where they arose.  This then fed into an open discussion 
led principally by the participants themselves, during which they selected certain problem-areas to 
explore in depth according to those considered most pressing.  The card arrangements from the 
preceding exercise, which remained on the table, acted as a form of topic guide, allowing a basic level 
of thematic order to be sustained and a diversity of topics to be discussed, while still respecting 
speakers’ inclination to focus on some topics over others and to explore cross-cutting themes.  In this 
open phase, the researcher intervened occasionally to bring participants into discussion, to ask 
speakers to elaborate with examples, and to ask questions to do with causality and political agency of 
the kind described below.
7
  Importantly, no attempt was made to draw conversation towards the EU or 
‘things European’ until the discussions were near conclusion.   
Allowing participants to determine the categories by which the discussions were ordered 
served a purpose in the subsequent analysis: it allowed the researcher to choose an analytical scheme 
with an empirical basis in the texts.  While no two groups produced the exact same ordering criteria, 
and the analyst is inevitably an active interpreter, one can arrive at a series of thematic headings 
reflecting the topics discussed in greatest detail across the interviews and the ways these tended to be 
clustered in the exercise and open discussion.  Three headings are used in the following analysis: 
Economics (understood to include, amongst others, problems of (un)employment, wages, price rises, 
taxation, inequality, and social security), Relations between Peoples (encompassing problems of 
intergroup conflict within and between states – often linked by speakers – and problems concerning 
the unwanted encounter with those deemed culturally different), and Society and the Law (including 
matters of crime, corruption, policing, the judicial system, social misdemeanour, and schooling).
8
  In 
formulating these headings, and selecting material for citation, special attention has been paid to the 
way speakers interacted and chose to acknowledge and pursue (or not) the interventions of others.  
Following (Gamson 1992), passages in which multiple participants were active and mutually 
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responsive are preferred to those where one speaker dominated and where evidence of reciprocal 
understanding is thus lacking.
9
  Taking these three headings as the units of study, the analysis focuses 
on the explanations speakers invoke when discussing these problems, the expectations they express 
concerning political agency, and, in the section thereafter, the ways these motifs are deployed when 
conversation touches on European integration.  
 
 
Explanatory Motifs and Expectations of Agency 
 
‘Explanation’ can be conceptualised in multiple ways (Antaki 1988).10  From the logician’s 
perspective, it may mean reported causality: explanations involve the explicit giving of reasons for the 
emergence of a problematic situation.  As a feature of everyday talk, where points may be made 
incrementally by multiple speakers, a looser definition is needed.  Indeed, even in the purest cases, a 
good portion of explanation lies not in explicit reason-giving but semantic meaning and assumptions 
of relevance.  There is a sense in which one may hear almost any utterance as explanatory depending 
on its context and the questions one asks of it (Draper 1988, p.16) (Antaki 1994 p.4).  We shall focus 
on patterns in what is deemed relevant to understanding a given set of problems.  These explanatory 
motifs may be thought of as culturally-available interpretative resources, employed by speakers to 
make sense of situations and experiences (Lamont & Thévenot 2000; Swidler 2001; White 2009b)  
They appeared spontaneously as speakers articulated and discussed the problems under consideration, 
but were also elicited by the researcher.  Direct questions, such as ‘how do you explain that problem?’ 
or ‘why does it arise?’, were combined with indirect ones exploring the attribution of responsibility 
and blame.  Such questions are ambiguous on the criteria of what is relevant, and so – given no 
response can include all possibly significant factors – force participants to exercise discrimination. 
Expectations of agency were likewise embedded in the flow of discussion, but were further 
elicited using probes such as ‘can that problem be avoided?’ and ‘can something be done about it?’  
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 Such an approach does not exclude intra-group disagreement, which may be abundant at the level of explicit opinion.  
However, its enabling condition is a basic level of agreement concerning how to thematise reality, else conversations fail.  
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 This article is informed by discursive approaches, but cf. ‘attribution theory’ in social psychology (Hewstone 1996).  
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Where the possibility of action was affirmed or denied, of interest would be the agents mentioned; 
further probes examined the expectations associated with these.  A useful sensitising framework is 
Perrin’s threefold distinction between expectations of agency centred on government, the general 
public, and the private individual (Perrin 2006, pp.63-4; pp.116ff).  The first involves the expectation 
that government officials can adopt policies to tackle the problems in question, and may be judged 
according to their willingness and success in pursuing these.  The second involves society-focused 
collective action such as the formation of social movements, the organising of boycotts, or the use of 
media to communicate to a wider public.  Both such approaches entail organised collective action, and 
offer a potential rationale for the polity as either the apparatus by which desired ends are sought or the 
space in which groups of citizens may coordinate for common purpose.  Conversely, a private 
approach involves moves to avoid problems rather than a coordinated effort to resolve them.  This last 
perspective, which supposes certain concerns can be addressed only by individual adaptation, offers 
few resources for making sense of a polity in terms of the pursuit of political projects.   
 Let us then move to the empirical material, looking at the explanatory motifs and expectations 
of agency identifiable for each of Economics, Relations between Peoples, and Society and the Law.  
 
 
Economics 
 
One of the first notable things about problems to do with Economics is that many of them elude 
explanation.  They form a large proportion of the discussions, and are discussed with urgency, but also 
with a certain mystery concerning their origins.  Dean in Swansea is not atypical when expressing 
amazement at how ‘the purchase of a house can go from … £50,000 to £200,000 in two years.  It’s 
ludicrous … more debt, more stress, more everything …  [Author:  Why are the prices going up so 
much do you think?]  Why has it gone up? … I don’t know, I can’t answer that.  […] Whether it’ll 
start coming down I don’t know. […] But you know, everything’s got to come to a head hasn’t it.’  
With similar uncertainty, when the Norwich group reports long-overdue improvements in the local 
economy, these are accounted for on the grounds that luck inevitably changes.  Vagueness on the 
causes of economic change need not produce the fatalist assertion they are beyond control – one can 
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imagine the view ‘it’s not our business to know, but someone in power ought to’ – but it seems 
probable that a lack of explanatory resources undermines the capacity to identify forms of political 
action able to influence such mechanisms and the inclination to associate these with public policy 
(Gamson 1992, p.6).  Absent certain basic tools of understanding, citizens would need to fall back on a 
strong and uncritical faith in the superior vision of political elites. 
While explanations are often thin on the ground for Economics, they are certainly not absent.  
Importantly – the second point to emphasise – where present they tend to be broad and transnational, 
indeed global, in scope.  They evoke factors extending far beyond the local environment where 
problems are encountered, and often considerably beyond Europe.  A passage from Reading brings 
this out, with participants building on each others’ points:11 
 
Malik:  …  England for example is not a manufacturing country any more.  Hi-tech, yes, but like the old 
stuff, it’s moved away from that into these lovely nice business parks and things and everybody’s in a 
nice suit and everything …  Everything’s changing, and you have to like sort-of [change with it]… If 
you say ‘I’m a rag-n-bone man, I want to stay a rag-n-bone man’, you can’t be because rag-n-bone 
man’s out the window.  Same like with the guy that used to have the horse and cart and drives the coal 
…  You know, it’s all changing, so you have to change with the time. 
 
Hanif:  There used to be a Huntley-Palmer factory [in Reading] …  They made biscuits …  
 
Malik:  Huntley-Palmers, yeah […] Also for example now, right, like with the new one, Prudential, right, 
they’ve taken their call centres over to India.  Why?  Because it’s cheaper.  Same with manufacturing.  
I mean, if I had a factory and I was paying … 
 
Saeed:  So, like, hang on, they pay the work to the Indians … so it’s less work in England then, isn’t it? 
 
Derek:  ’Course, yeah … but the economy for that company Prudential … they’re having a laugh … 
 
As Malik then summarises, ‘they pay pittance over there and we want minimum £10 an hour.’  The 
world of cheaper wages further east, whether in Eastern Europe or Asia, is a common motif across the 
groups when problems such as unemployment or the decline of industry are discussed.   
The fact that explanatory factors are remote, where given, is probably an important reason why 
the possibilities for governmental agency are assumed limited.  The drivers of change lie principally 
‘over there’, leaving few options for influence ‘here’.  Inevitability is a common theme, and cost 
imbalances are held decisive: ‘it’s supply and demand,’ says Malik, ‘… unless you start paying 
everybody 10p an hour for their jobs, you can’t compete with other countries now.’  A consensus in 
                                                 
11
 This passage appears 35 mins into the interview (15 mins into the open discussion).  It follows discussion of the social 
security system and the availability of work, and marks the beginning of a lengthy discussion on changing economic 
conditions in Britain, western Europe and east Asia.   
 9 
the Würzburg group is that politicians are ‘puppets’ when it comes to the economy.  Another motif 
holds that while yesterday’s politicians had opportunities to act decisively, e.g. by rejecting 
privatisation, today’s are powerless and it is too late to alter things.  Speakers in Kassel emphasise the 
government is unable to control the movement of manufacturers: ‘That doesn’t work any more,’ says 
Peter; ‘it’s simply too late …’, says Hans; ‘in the past … in the past,’ chips in Dieter, ‘we’ve got no 
chance now.  The train has left the station.’  While viable in the past, governmental action today is 
implausible.  To these widely diffused patterns one may add local variations: speakers in the Czech 
groups emphasise the dependence of economic conditions in their country on the health of 
neighbouring economies such as Germany’s,12 while the Czech state’s weak finances are further said 
to undermine its capacity to alleviate hardship.  Such concerns intensify the sense of powerlessness 
found more widely across the groups.  
 Positive proposals are occasionally heard.  Some speakers suggest individuals should adapt to 
new economic circumstances by learning new skills (cf. Malik above) – a private response, in other 
words – though rarely is it suggested this would be sufficient.  Individual consumer action against 
departing firms is also occasionally advocated, yet considered hindered by the way economic 
processes extend far afield.  Peter in Kassel notes a limit to what consumers can do: ‘if I had an 
account with Deutsche Bank, I’d cancel it.  I’d boycott such firms.  The thing is, everything’s so 
interwoven these days, you don’t really know … [Dieter: yeah] … where they all work, where they 
produce …  Whatever you do, the glasses will come from somewhere, you can’t say “I’m not drinking 
that any more because the glass doesn’t come from Germany.”  That’s the problem, because ultimately 
you simply can’t separate it out.’  Not only this but organised action of a public kind, such as a 
collective boycott, is cast in doubt with scepticism regarding the firmness of other citizens.  Even if 
people like ‘us’ were to take the initiative, the danger is the rest would not follow.   
 In sum, the dominant pattern across the groups holds there are few possibilities for action on 
problems of Economics.  With these treated either as a matter of puzzlement, or seen as heavily 
dependent on distant processes, the prospect of organised collective action, governmental or public, is 
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considered heavily circumscribed.  Speakers generally invoke ‘the government’, ‘politicians’ or ‘the 
state’ as the most relevant reference-points, but regularly to write off their capacities.   
 
 
Relations between Peoples 
 
Descriptions of problems to do with intergroup conflict and the unwanted encounter with cultural 
difference are not immune from a sense of mystery.  Peter in Kassel is not the only participant to fear 
war ultimately as arbitrary: ‘all you need is for someone who’s a bit hysterical to come to power and 
someday he presses the [nuclear] button.’  But aside from assertions of contingency one does find 
explanatory motifs, the difficulty being that not only are some rather disturbing, but they encourage 
the problems articulated to be regarded as unsolvable. 
 Two sets of motif recur, both primarily externalising responsibility for bad relations onto 
others.  One points to the unequal global distribution of power and resources, causing conflict as those 
in a position of inferiority seek gains.  That ‘it’s all about power’ is a common refrain.  Another set, 
perhaps more common, focuses on ‘other peoples’ expressing supposedly intrinsic characteristics, be it 
extremism, intransigence, or an undue attachment to religion and ‘ideology’.  Wars are generally 
projected onto far-away places of contrast like Africa or the Middle East, where – as participants in the 
Lübeck group put it – ‘there are fanatics on both sides’, people are ‘stubborn’ and ‘unwilling to sit 
down with each other and work out a compromise’, so ‘they get each other more and more worked up 
until it becomes really extreme.’  Contemporary Europe and ‘the West’ are generally considered 
places of peace.  Yet conflict intrudes.  Immigration is the obvious way speakers make this link, with 
the suggestion that those arriving from afar bring their natural characteristics with them.  The problem 
tends to be cast as the unwillingness or inability of such peoples to compromise on their differences, 
seeking instead to impose their customs and ways of life.  As Zbyněk in Ostrava put it, in a 
formulation echoed widely, ‘Muslims don’t know how to compromise.  It’s a completely different 
mentality.’  Such motifs are applied to a range of developments, from the building of mosques in the 
local area to acts of violence and terrorism. 
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The possibilities for amelioration are again considered limited, probably in part because the 
way they are understood implies they are out of ‘our’ hands.  Rarely does one find the idea relations 
can be improved through dialogue or mutual understanding.  ‘You’re never gonna stop war,’ says 
Derek in Reading, and ‘I can’t do nothing about it.’  Instead, the idea of irreconcilable difference is 
emphasised: for Peter and Dieter at Kassel, ‘people’s opinions are simply too different’.  Conflict is 
normalised, and tackling these problems tends to be presented as a matter of reducing exposure.  
Governmental action at the national level remains the principal reference-point: stricter immigration 
policies are a predictably well-cited possibility, accompanied by concerns they would be ineffective 
due to the ingenuity of those arriving and the numbers already ‘here’.  Public approaches, and those 
based on individual action, are scarcely mentioned.  The tendency to assume problems experienced at 
a local level also play out on a wider scale is probably a contributing element in the scepticism, in that 
it implies such problems transcend polity boundaries.  They are neither purely local and therefore 
susceptible to local address, nor purely distant and therefore susceptible to a policy of disengagement.   
 
 
Society and the Law 
 
For problems such as crime and social misdemeanour, explanations are found reliably – there is less 
the sense of mystery here.  Such problems tend to attract focus on the behaviour and mentalities of 
local actors, with explanatory factors including family upbringing, school discipline levels, and the 
willingness of law-enforcement agencies to apply the rules.  Transnational factors are rarely cited, 
even though in principle one might imagine references to wider phenomena such declining religious 
faith in modern societies, the impact of technological change, or the rise of criminal networks. 
 The sense that something can be done varies, but is generally stronger than we have 
encountered so far – perhaps precisely because the focus is more local.  Improving the national 
education system so as to raise honest citizens is widely regarded a credible objective.  Punitive 
measures against criminals are a second way government-led action is affirmed.  More police on the 
streets, together with stronger criminal sentencing, are obvious expressions of this sentiment, with the 
national government sometimes actively blamed where these expectations are unmet.  ‘We were 
 12 
promised three strikes and you’re out, weren’t we,’ says Malcolm in Norwich, ‘that was one of the 
reasons I’ve voted for this government.’  All fellow participants assent to his suggestion that higher 
taxation would be acceptable to see the laws properly enforced.  The exception to this more 
affirmative tone is found in the Czech groups, where the weakness of state finances is again deemed a 
constraint, as likewise the prevalence of corruption: indeed, here the legal system is sometimes 
described as another expression of rule-breaking rather than a potential solution. 
 The possibility of society-led public approaches is raised in several groups.  Other citizens are 
to be encouraged to ostracise misbehavers, and if people will ‘stand up for the rules’ then positive 
change is possible.  Such ideas are heard frequently amongst the British and German groups; in the 
Czech and Erfurt groups, one encounters a distinctive form of fatalism based on the notion that a large 
proportion of society remains morally tarnished by its association with communism, and that the 
arrival of a ‘new generation’ is needed before a wider change in attitudes can be expected. 
 To summarise, the sense of agency for these problems, while still qualified, is stronger than 
elsewhere.  Especially amongst the British and German groups, education and law enforcement are 
considered convincing governmental approaches – though the authority involved is national or sub-
national, and there is no reference to a transnational context.   
 
 These points are summarised in the table below.  Rendition in boxes risks excessive 
simplification and a sense of determinism.  It deserves emphasis that while discursive practices are 
patterned, attempts to express these patterns are procrustean, since speakers may sometimes diverge 
from them, and – relatedly – since new patterns are always in generation.  Nothing said so far excludes 
the possibility individuals may question or reject some of the motifs they encounter.   
 Principally it is governmental action which speakers mention: ‘politicians’ (generically, and as 
individual leaders), ‘the government’ (in the abstract, and in the guise of ruling parties) and ‘the State’ 
are the main reference-points, while reference to private and public approaches are rarer.
13
  Yet often 
                                                 
13
 Other than some isolated remarks about taxi-driver organisations, there are two references in total to NGOs – and these 
as examples of embezzlement.  This indifference towards organised civil society may be a European specificity: cf. (Perrin 
2006), in whose US groups public action is more prominent.  
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political actors are assumed lacking in power, especially where the problems faced are traced out to a 
global level. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
 
 Economics Relations between Peoples Society & the Law 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
Motifs 
 
 
Often lacking. 
 
Alternatively very broad, 
stretching beyond Europe – 
global price & wage inequality, 
the ‘cheaper East’. 
 
Variation: in CZ, ‘the East’ starts 
further east (e.g. Ukraine). 
 
 
Generally broad, stretching 
beyond Europe – global 
inequalities of power and 
resources; intransigent impulses 
of opponent ‘peoples’. 
 
Variation: less discussion of these 
topics in CZ than GB and D, 
though similar motifs appear. 
 
Generally local – mentalities 
& conduct of local actors; 
declining levels of discipline; 
weak institutions of 
enforcement. 
 
Variation: in CZ + Erfurt, 
references to communist past as 
further source of problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Possibilities 
for Action 
 
 
 
 
Governmental: Little.  Sense of 
inevitability; global price / wage 
inequalities assumed conclusive; 
‘too late’ to act.  
Variation: in CZ + Erfurt, 
references to constraining effect 
of weak state finances and 
economic dependence on western 
Europe. 
 
Public: Little.  Boycotts 
mentioned, but problems of 
identifying who to target, and 
getting others to cooperate.   
 
Private: Some.  Individual 
adaptation (e.g. acquiring new 
skills); enlightened consumerism 
where feasible. 
 
 
Governmental: Little. 
Conflict largely inevitable.  Can 
reduce exposure, e.g. with 
immigration controls.   
Variation: occasional reference 
in GB (not D / CZ) to use of 
military force where necessary. 
 
Public: Not mentioned. 
 
Private: Not mentioned. 
 
Governmental:  Some.  
Improve schooling; stronger 
law enforcement.   
Variation: in CZ, references to 
constraining effect of weak 
state finances and corruption. 
 
Public: Some.  Ostracisation of 
rule-breakers – if others in 
society willing to ‘stand up’.  
Variation: in CZ, need to await 
new, uncorrupted generation. 
 
Private: Some.  Better home 
education; personal action (inc. 
vigilante-style) against rule-
breakers. 
 
 Abbreviations: GB – Britain; D – Germany; CZ – Czech Rep. 
  
 
Europe and the EU in Discussion 
 
At this point we can resume focus on the matter of political authority at a European level.  As the 
reader will recall, at stake is not the general question of what citizens think of the EU but a more 
targeted one to do with political justification: with what degree of credulity is a project-oriented 
rationale for the EU likely to be received?  Looking at how ‘Europe’ and the EU are evoked in these 
discussions allows examination of the significance of the patterns identified so far – how they may 
‘carry over’ to the idea of a European polity.  Of particular interest, given speakers’ emphasis on 
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governmental forms of action and their perceived limitations, is the extent to which the EU comes to 
be regarded as an augmentation of, even a substitute for, governmental agency at the national level, or 
conversely is assumed to be suffering from the same – and perhaps additional – shortcomings. 
 As indicated, the researcher made no concerted effort to steer these discussions towards 
Europe-related matters until the interviews were near conclusion.  In each discussion references to 
these did appear naturally at some stage, featuring a range of terms, principally ‘the EU’ (the most 
common term in the German groups, and amongst the Czechs in the expanded form of ‘the European 
Union’, though rare amongst the British) and ‘Europe’ (used fairly frequently as shorthand for the EU, 
especially in the British discussions).
14
  These references were considerably more common than those 
to other transnational political arrangements such as the United Nations or to transnational economic 
institutions.
15
  They were significantly less common though than references to governmental actors at 
the national level.
16
 
 For the purposes of analysis a distinction can be made between two kinds of EU-related 
reference.  The first involves the direct expression of opinions concerning the Union’s institutions, 
decision-making procedures, and the transfer of sovereignty, separate from the context of substantive 
political problems.  An emblematic example would be the complaint made by Alan in Swansea about 
the money wasted (‘£20 million or something’) each time ‘Brussels’ moves from Brussels to 
Strasbourg.  Such opinions, though conceivably an influence on perceptions of agency, are not the 
focus here, since they were rare and appeared mostly in response to the researcher’s direct questioning 
about the EU late in discussion.  Of close to 100 EU-related references in the data, only nine were 
detached in this way from substantive concerns.  Perhaps this relative infrequency is because such 
                                                 
14
 The terminology itself is interesting: greater familiarity (perhaps not approval) seems implied by the frequency of the 
abbreviation ‘EU’ in the German groups, while the use of ‘Europe’ by British speakers suggests a more distant 
relationship.  Occasionally one finds other terms too: ‘Brussels’ (used sometimes amongst the British, generally 
pejoratively), the ‘common’, ‘internal’ or ‘European market’, and ‘the euro countries’ (this appearing occasionally in the 
British discussions to indicate a wider political grouping beyond the eurozone).  For simplicity, the umbrella term ‘Europe 
and the EU’ is used to summarise.  References to specific countries or regions in Europe, e.g. in the form of transnational 
comparisons, are not examined here, though cf. (White 2009a). 
15
 The UN was mentioned just once, while the IMF, World Bank and WTO were never mentioned.  Note also that not only 
were such structures absent in name but the concept of them (e.g. of global government) was also un-mentioned.  NATO 
was mentioned once. 
16
 In total, 254 mentions of governmental actors at the national level (including ‘the government’, ‘the State’, political 
parties, or individual politicians and heads of state) were counted, and 94 mentions of the EU or related terms (cf. fnt. 13).  
In addition to this basic difference in visibility, virtually none of the latter kind distinguished between the EU institutions, 
mentioned Euro-parties or party groupings, or identified EU-related individuals.  (These figures are indicative: where one 
speaker repeated a reference twice in quick succession, only one was recorded; also, judgement was required to distinguish 
mentions of ‘Europe’ with political content from those referring simply to a geographical space.) 
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references concern phenomena specific to the EU’s institutional configuration, about which public 
levels of knowledge are notoriously low and of which ignorance is often conceded.
17
  Even criticising 
the EU on procedural grounds requires a familiarity with its institutions which may rare.  Perhaps 
infrequency also reflects diminished concern.  While questions of the mechanisms and ‘finality’ of 
integration will properly be of salience to scholars, it seems natural those without a professional 
interest may prefer to work outwards from problems of immediate concern, and to invoke ‘Europe’ 
only where it is assumed to have bearing.
18
  We shall focus on these problem-related references.  
 It will have been anticipated from the preceding section that for one set of problems – Society 
and the Law – the significance ascribed to the EU is basically non-existent.  These are problems given 
prominence across the groups, but attention is on the domestic, with explanations local in focus.  One 
sees relatively positive assumptions of agency, with roles ascribed to national government and fellow 
citizens.  Importantly, such a perspective implies speakers are not reflexly cynical about all forms of 
political agency – government ‘has its place’, at least for certain problems.  Nor is it a perspective 
incompatible with a European polity, since the possibility of decentralising authority is expressed in 
the EU’s principle of subsidiarity.  But undoubtedly it is a perspective which invites little positive 
significance to be ascribed to the EU – instead it is overlooked.   
 In discussion of Economics (especially) and Relations between Peoples (somewhat), ‘Europe’ 
and the EU are invoked more.
19
  That a connection is made on both reminds that the meaning ascribed 
to the EU cannot be reduced to a single register of evaluation, whether economic or cultural-
geopolitical.  It also implies the absence of references on Society and the Law is no mere artefact of 
the interview format, since otherwise one would expect similar reticence across the full range of topics 
discussed.  Yet this was not the case: for Economics and Relations between Peoples, such references 
did appear.  Surely linked is the fact that both sets of problems are described transnationally, with 
explanatory motifs including factors extending well beyond the local environment.  This would seem 
to suggest some of the ideational ‘raw materials’ are in place for speakers to make positive sense of 
                                                 
17
 See e.g. (OPTEM 2006) on knowledge levels and attitudes to the EU institutions. 
18
 The focus on substantive problems might also be suspected as a reason, but note that one of the problems discussed – 
‘corruption’ – provided considerable opportunity for a discussion of the EU in these terms if desired. 
19
 The prominence of economic perspectives on the EU is also evident in the findings of the ‘Citizens Talking about 
Europe’ (CITES) project; see also (Díez Medrano 2009). 
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the EU.  Yet when one recalls more closely the patterns identified above, the difficulties will be 
apparent.  While speakers do occasionally raise the prospect of political action at a European level 
(understood in governmental terms, for society-based forms of action at a European level are not 
mentioned), it is generally with severe doubts attached.  Furthermore, references to ‘Europe’ and the 
EU are not always references to the (im)possibility of political action, but to the unfolding of problems 
themselves. 
 Fully consistent with the emphasis on irresistible forces at a global level, speakers give little 
suggestion that European approaches may succeed where conventional ones fail.  The EU is very 
rarely mentioned in these discussions as a means of addressing economic problems which cannot be 
addressed by national government.  Nor is it much blamed for failing to act, something which might 
imply the possibility.  Given the underlying understanding of the problems in question, the EU would 
need to appear as a kind of deus ex machina, an unexpected rupture from the narrative frame, in order 
to be seen as a decisive and positive influence.  It comes closest to this in the Czech groups, where 
credit is occasionally given for infrastructure improvements: Robert in Plzeň notes judiciously that ‘it 
can be said that in the time we’ve been in the EU the situation’s improved.’  Michal confirms: ‘the 
Union’s contributed to the construction of every bridge here, large and small.’  It remains doubtful 
however whether such EU-led action is seen as an expression of agency rather than a welcome but 
mysterious change in fortunes.  Generally, with most economic problems linked in discussion to 
global factors far beyond the borders of Europe, little positive role is accorded to a European polity.   
 Instead, across the groups, and particularly in the German and Czech discussions, various 
current EU policies come to be heavily entwined with such problems, such that the Union is treated as 
an expression or exacerbation of them.  This can be seen in several instances.  Discussion of the euro’s 
introduction, for example, exhibits the familiar motif of inevitability.  Participants in Ostrava talk of 
the prospect of the euro as a ‘catastrophe’, but are agreed it will come.  For Pavel in Plzeň, ‘the only 
question is when.’  In a Lübeck passage, a specific grievance with discrepancies created by the EU is 
linked together with a more general sense of powerlessness before wider economic forces:
20
 
                                                 
20
  The passage appears 26 mins into the interview (10 mins into the open discussion).  The focus since the card exercise 
has been on economic issues: unemployment, price rises due to the euro, problems of mis-regulation, and the impact of 
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Jochen:  All these Polish workers, the manual labourers – tilers, bricklayers, for example – they work here in 
such favourable conditions because they don’t have to contribute social-security taxes [W:  Right …] like a 
German labourer has to.  A German labourer is checked to make sure he makes all his contributions.  And a 
Polish worker comes over and says ‘yeah, I’ll do that,’ but no-one bothers about him so long as he’s not 
caught, so long as no-one catches him doing black labour, so he can afford to offer attractive prices.  He 
can work as a bricklayer, a tiler, he’s flexible.  And naturally unemployment isn’t going to get better like 
that, it’s going to get worse. 
 
Werner:  I find it really, really bad, if that … what the EU Directive says, concerning the free movement of 
services, if that goes through, then Polish and Czech employees, or from Lithuania too … If they’re 
allowed to work with us here under their own conditions then no small entrepreneur’s going to be able to 
survive here.  The German master-bricklayer, or the bricklayer, or the tiler who works for himself, he has to 
pay his taxes, his contributions to the professional association, he has to contribute his share to employees’ 
health insurance, pension insurance etc., and none of them have that so they can set more attractive prices.  
And so that also disturbs our economy.  
 
Author:  Is there any solution to this kind of problem … can one do something about it?   
 
Jochen:  Well, the world is heading ever more towards globalisation, and globalisation is … in the future an 
equalisation between poor countries and rich countries …  And this process won’t be complete within the 
next few years, it’ll be very, very slow, it’ll last a really long time, until Uzbekistan has the same standard 
of living as we do, for example, as the Federal Republic of Germany.  And then sometime far off in the 
distant future – fiction really – this problem will naturally be solved.  But that’ll definitely take generations. 
 
Niklas:  The standards are closing towards each other … Not everyone is going to get such a high standard as 
here ... 
 
Werner:  It’ll go down here and go up for the others, that’s clear. 
 
Jochen:  You can see that already in the EU.  That some countries profit from it and other countries … [W: … 
suffer from it …] suffer from it. 
 
Author:  Which ones profit, for example? 
 
Jochen:  The ones who profit are the poorer countries with the low GNP.  And the industrial countries, they 
basically have to step down from their level, surrender their achievements.  To put it simply. 
           
Author:  What do you expect of the government in this context?  [J:  Difficult …]  What can it do? 
 
Werner:  Very, very difficult … [N: … to find solutions …] 
 
Jochen:  Many say we should go back, we should have the Deutschmark instead of the euro, the borders must be 
… the walls must be erected again, then everything will be better again.  But whether that’s the solution, 
I’d strongly doubt it.  [N:  I don’t think so either.] 
 
Werner:  This process is no longer reversible. 
 
 
Changes associated with the EU, such as the opening of borders and the arrival of the euro, are 
described as symptoms of a broader process of globalisation and the loss of boundaries.  Attempts to 
introduce barriers are likely to be futile, for it is an irreversible long-term process.  Note ‘you can see 
that already in the EU’, implying the EU is the first or most immediate expression.  The euro comes 
across as neither positive nor negative, neither a remedy nor a mistake, but the extension of a pattern.  
In this and other groups, participants do raise complaints about the manner in which it was introduced 
                                                                                                                                            
immigrant labour.  Subsequent discussion looks at how further EU enlargement may exacerbate problems of job 
competition and high taxes, and why manufacturers are moving to east Asia. 
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– ‘no-one asked us, there should have been a referendum,’ says Hamid in Lübeck – but this is not 
matched by a sense the outcome might have been different.  The EU follows wider trends. 
 
 When discussion touches problems of Relations between Peoples, one finds further reference 
to ‘Europe’ and the EU.  As noted, questions of intergroup conflict are generally not associated with 
the majority-peoples of ‘the West’ as these are constructed in discussion.  Their relations are assumed 
peaceful, and war between them unlikely.  As Ralf in Würzburg puts it, ‘the only conflicts which are 
left are far away from us, and here in Central Europe, in Europe, in the EU area we have a very 
peaceful shared existence.  I think that’s very important, that’s a historical step forward.  Germany-
Britain, the bombardment in the Second World War, this hard enmity is gone, gone once and for all.’  
Perhaps because this assumption is made readily, a role for the EU in coordinating harmonious 
relations – one of its classic justifications, after all – appears superfluous.  When Ralf suggests the EU 
might be given credit for the emergence of peaceful coexistence, his co-participants are dubious, 
especially about such a role today.   
 Nor does the EU tend to be accorded a positive role as regards those inter-people relations 
quite clearly problematised.  Building up ‘Europe’ as a global power in military and defence so as to 
manage threats emerging from outside – another form of action, desirable or not – is a proposal heard 
rarely in these discussions.  That ‘the West’ evokes something broader than Europe probably weakens 
the extent to which acting at a European level is given credence; likewise the assumption that 
opponents are living within the local environment, not just beyond.  They can be encountered on the 
city streets, not just in far-away locations.  When the problem is thus constructed as one of daily 
exposure, the relevance of foreign and defence policy at any level is much diminished.  
 Compared to Economics, it is rare for the EU to be treated as a contributing factor to the 
problems articulated.  Prospective Turkish membership is the notable exception.  In Lübeck, during a 
discussion of awkward relations with ‘Ausländer’, Jochen comments with collective approval that 
‘these differences in mentality, they’re particularly serious with regard to Turkey’s entry [into the EU] 
… It’ll get even more extreme.  Because that’s where the Orient meets the Occident, isn’t it.  
Practically two different cultures.  I think that’s really, really difficult.’   
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TABLE 2 
 
 Economics Relations between Peoples Society & the Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evocations of 
‘Europe’ / EU  
 
Mentioned regularly.   
 
But rarely as possible augmentation or 
substitute for nat. governmental agency. 
Variation: speakers in CZ acknowledge 
possibility EU might herald economic 
improvements. 
 
Often mentioned as expression of 
problems themselves, picking up familiar 
motifs of exposure to global forces, 
irresistibility of changes, irreversibility of 
decisions. 
Variation: above true esp. amongst D and 
CZ groups; speakers in UK make similar 
points, but more rarely. 
 
 
Mentioned sometimes. 
 
Occasional references to 
possibility of a European security 
policy.  But generally dismissed – 
peace between ‘European’ peoples 
already secure, while the serious 
problems not considered European 
in origin or effect - both more 
global and local. 
 
Occasionally mentioned as a 
source of problems, mainly re. 
enlargement to Turkey. 
Variation: no such mentions 
amongst UK groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not mentioned 
 
 
Let us draw the threads of the argument together.  As ‘Europe’ and the EU are invoked in these 
discussions, speakers readily link them with the problems of everyday life.  In doing so, they draw on 
the repertoires of understanding available to them for making sense of these problems, thus entwining 
the EU in these wider patterns.  In three major ways, such patterns do little to ‘make sense of’ the EU 
in positive political terms.  First, there are problems from which it is ostensibly deemed too remote to 
be relevant (mainly those to do with law and order and antisocial behaviour), with these problems 
understood as local in origin and effect.  Second, with regard to those problems for which it is ascribed 
relevance, the EU takes on the sense of powerlessness before mysterious or inevitable forces attributed 
to governmental agency more generally, thus undermining the possibility it might be regarded as a 
suitable response to these.  And third, more than this, its policies come to be linked to many of the 
problems raised, casting it as an expression, perhaps even an exacerbation, of them.  In each of these 
three ways, the dominant tone evoked is perhaps not so much that of active hostility towards the EU as 
a combination of indifference and knowing resignation – notwithstanding the seriousness accorded to 
the problems themselves.   
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Note it is not argued the only factor conditioning citizen perspectives on the EU is its degree of 
accordance with these patterns of political understanding.  The discussions were focused from the 
outset on substantive problems, not for instance feelings of cultural or values-based commonality: they 
consequently do not provide a comprehensive catalogue of reasons why the EU may be seen 
negatively or with apathy.  To reiterate, it is the plausibility of a project-oriented rationale for the EU 
which is at stake.  Moreover, as noted, the interview structure was deliberately kept quite open, with 
the researcher generally refraining from challenging participants to articulate views on the EU so as to 
focus on wider assumptions.  While this avoids embedding Euro-centrism in the research design, still 
one must acknowledge that why ‘Europe’ and the EU are evoked in certain ways at certain moments, 
and left unspoken at others, can only be the subject of interpretative claims.  What gives these claims 
their plausibility is the consistency they highlight between patterns of sense-making on Europe as a 
political phenomenon and patterns of political interpretation more generally. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Accepting this reading of the material, how should one judge the implications?  To continue the 
preceding thought, individual cognitive processes at a particular moment, such as at the polling booth 
when deciding whether to endorse further integration, can only be a matter of conjecture.  Some such 
individuals may draw directly on the motifs identified; others, following the expectations of 
psychological approaches, may act according to ostensibly unrelated emotions to do with how 
‘European’ they feel and how they respond to Europe-related symbols (Bruter 2005).  Others – surely 
a minority – may be persuaded more by procedural concerns to do with (perceptions of) how the 
Brussels institutions are run.  Others may not even get to the polling booth.  If the patterned ways in 
which citizens interpret the political world are important, it is not necessarily in the sense one can 
attribute them a causal status for individual actions at a given moment. 
 Rather than as determinative in the particular instance, this ideational background is better seen 
as exercising a more general enabling and constraining effect on various political aspects of 
citizenship.  First, as suggested, it may shape the kinds of arguments that can feasibly be made on 
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behalf of political authority and those unlikely to resonate, thus influencing general levels of consent 
towards the polity.  Project-oriented justifications for the EU, referring e.g. to the possibilities it holds 
for addressing problems to do with economics or migration, will be received as convincing only to the 
extent those projects themselves are held credible.  Second, it may influence levels of political 
vigilance and participation, for only if citizens have the tools of imagination to see the EU as a 
possible deliverer of political goods are they likely to seek assurance its policies approximate the 
standards this requires.  Without this necessary basis on which to judge and criticise, the risk will be 
that the legal and political rights of EU citizenship are neglected, leaving a passive and manipulated 
citizenry.  Also, while these ideational features may not determine electoral outcomes, they may affect 
which political actors have the best resources at their disposal.  Certain routinised ways of seeing can 
be used to mobilise supporters behind a political programme, and to encourage transnational alliances 
and supranational claims-making in its pursuit, while others inhibit such action (Gamson 1992).  
Projects of economic redistribution, or intercultural dialogue, would be pertinent cases in point. 
 The way the EU is drawn into these discussions with taxi-drivers rather jars with the notion its 
political viability and legitimacy rest on addressing the substantive concerns of citizens.  Even 
supposing the EU does perform this beneficial role, such a message is not easily ‘hearable’ for those of 
its citizens drawing on the patterns of interpretation traced.  Certainly the findings suggest these 
difficulties are not restricted to the EU, since the political capacities of national institutions are 
questioned analogously (albeit rather more actively, and with a lingering sense of what may be 
achieved on certain issues).  But the consequences of such thinking are especially damaging in the EU 
case, for a transnational polity is not only permanently vulnerable to a dissolution into its component 
parts, but is less able to draw on some of the additional sources of allegiance associated with the 
nation-state.  The ties generated by commonality of culture and history, or the commitments born of 
routine and repeated exposure, may ensure that in the nation-state context the question ‘what is the 
polity for?’ either finds an instinctive answer or is not even posed; yet these ties and commitments 
seem absent in the European context and unlikely to emerge.   
 Given the observations made, changes in certain common patterns of political understanding 
seem a necessary accompaniment to any deepening of the EU’s political credibility.  Such changes are 
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possible, since rather than expressing a uniquely correct way to appraise the political world, these 
patterns express contingent interpretations.  Reality is sufficiently complex as to resist definitive 
representation (Sewell 2005, p.191).  Indeed, changes are inescapable, since these discursive patterns 
are reproduced through acts of human interpretation, and must respond to the creativity individuals 
bring to this.  While generally enduring, there may be moments of crisis and conflict when such 
commonsense ideas are swiftly remade.  The task for suitably inclined political actors would be to 
make available new ways of interpreting the problems of everyday life so as to make better sense of 
the possibilities for their organised address (Tarrow & Tilly 2007; Tilly 2003).  Judging by this study, 
these would need to offer ways of understanding the origins of problems such that they did not appear 
the outcome of mysterious forces or the inevitable consequence of human nature, and would need to 
dispute the tendency to locate causal factors either at a quite local level or far beyond Europe’s 
borders.  Only then is political agency at a European level likely to escape the triple hazards of 
seeming remote from, dwarfed by, or partly responsible for, the challenges it might seek to address.  
The articulation of new sets of problems little heard in these discussions, for instance to do with the 
environment, would further expand the stock of resources with which such arguments could be made. 
 
The paper began with a quotation from Ralf, a taxi-driver in Würzburg.  His words conjure the 
EU, specifically its process of enlargement, as an economic phenomenon, both in its goals – the 
creation of markets – and its consequences – the migration of companies to the East.  As the 
subsequent analysis has indicated, the sense of fatalism he conveys can be read as part of a more 
general mood speakers evoke when articulating matters of economic concern.  The ‘door’ which has 
been opened in the EU can no longer be closed, just as it is ‘too late’ to control the economic forces of 
globalisation.  Such motifs weaken the credibility of counter-arguments seeking to portray the EU as a 
positive means to address the substantive concerns of its citizens, and, one may suppose, any resolve 
to ensure it fulfils such a role.  If a project-oriented rationale of this kind is to have resonance, it would 
seem to require wider changes in the interpretative schemes by which the political world is imagined. 
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